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Payoff implications of incentive contracting
Daniel F. Garrett
Department of Economics, University of Essex
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of
introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an
analyst who does not know the agent’s preferences for responding to incentives,
but does know that the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight
bounds on the principal’s expected benefit from optimal incentive contracting
across feasible values of the agent’s expected rents. We thus show how economi-
cally relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance of a key primitive.




Economists often emphasize the virtues of incentives across settings from regulation
and procurement to worker and executive compensation. Nonetheless, moves to in-
troduce explicit incentives are often criticized for leaving large rents to agents. This is
particularly true when the principal in the relationship appears to gain little from of-
fering incentives. To give an example, reforms in the United Kingdom in the 1980s led
public utilities to be privatized and subjected to regulation, part of an effort to harness
the efficiency advantages of financial incentives. Later, the Blair government introduced
the “windfall tax” on utility companies, a response to negative public sentiment sur-
rounding the earlier reforms. The negative sentiment was fed by both the magnitude of
corporate profits and a perception that the public (or, more directly, the government as
principal) had failed to benefit from the changes.1
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Economic theory offers a possible lens through which to examine the distribution
of welfare that results from the introduction of incentives. Yet, putting incentive the-
ory to work, say to make predictions on welfare implications, is difficult. In particular,
determining the fundamentals of the economic environment is often challenging. It
is, therefore, natural to ask what predictions are possible when details of the economic
environment are not well understood.
This paper is concerned with the predictions available when ambiguity concern-
ing the environment persists due to a lack of experience with incentives. We consider
a canonical single-agent procurement framework where incentive contracts are to be
newly introduced. We then determine the predictions available to an analyst who is
ignorant regarding the agent’s preferences (equivalently, technology) for responding to
incentives. We suppose the analyst does, however, correctly anticipate the contracting
model, and that the principal will choose the incentive contract to minimize expected
payments given knowledge of the agent’s preferences. That is, while the principal solves
a well known procurement model, the analyst is tasked with predicting outcomes in the
absence of a key primitive.
Apart from regularity conditions on the agent’s preferences, our analyst has no way
to determine the agent’s willingness to respond to incentives. The agent might be highly
responsive to any incentives offered or not responsive at all. For this reason, the analyst
has no hope of making informative predictions on the absolute level of the agent’s per-
formance, or on the gains to the principal of incentive contracting (say relative to an al-
ternative regime where no incentives are offered). However, it turns out that statements
on relative payoffs of the players are possible. Our main contribution is to obtain a lower
bound on the principal’s gains from incentives given possible values of the agent’s ex-
pected rents. This bound is negligible conditional on the agent earning negligible rent
in an optimal incentive contract, but it increases with the agent’s rents. Consider then a
policy maker or other interested party who has the same information as the analyst and
is concerned about the possibility of large agent rents under an optimal contract. For in-
stance, in public procurement where the agent is a private contractor, the concern may
be about enriching wealthy shareholders and exacerbating inequality. The analyst can
offer the prediction that if the agent’s preferences (or technology) turn out to be such
that he can expect high rents, then the expected gains from incentive contracting will lie
above a known bound. Depending on the value of the bound, such a prediction might
offer some reassurance.
Details of the setting
We specialize in this paper to a procurement model where the principal obtains a fixed
number of units from the agent. Realized production costs are public, so payments to
the agent can be conditioned on them; i.e., the setting is one of cost-based procure-
ment. The cost of supplying these units without effort—often termed the agent’s innate
cost—is the agent’s private information. The agent can privately choose effort to reduce
the publicly observed production cost below his innate cost. The agent’s preferences
for cost-reducing effort are characterized by a disutility of effort function, taken to be
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increasing, convex, and independent of the innate cost. The principal, having a prior
on the innate costs and knowing the disutility function, offers an optimal contract. Op-
timal contracts can be determined using a mechanism design approach, as in Laffont
and Tirole (1986).
As noted, the analyst’s problem is to determine welfare predictions for optimal con-
tracts. These predictions are made knowing that the above model of cost-based procure-
ment applies and given the prior on innate costs, but without knowledge of the agent’s
disutility function. Availability of a prior on innate costs is in line with the analyst hav-
ing observations on past cost performance under cost-plus contracting. Since cost-plus
contracts pay the agent only the observed production cost, these contracts provide no
incentives for effort and so induce a production cost equal to the innate cost. One inter-
pretation of the analyst’s problem is that she is tasked with informing a policy decision
to introduce incentive contracts given a history of cost-plus contracting. While the an-
alyst is ignorant of the disutility function, she anticipates the information will become
available to the principal if a decision to implement incentive contracting proceeds (say,
because implementation is accompanied by further study of the agent’s technology or
by the hiring of external expertise).
Main results
Our main results characterize the expected payoffs from optimal incentive contracting
across all permitted agent preferences for cost-reducing effort. A range of values for ex-
pected agent rents is possible in an optimal contract, depending on the disutility func-
tion. We find a lower bound on the principal’s gains from incentives for each level of
agent rents that is not only increasing with agent rents (as mentioned above), but is also
convex. Convexity provides a stronger sense in which the principal’s relative guarantee
improves with the welfare of the agent.
We then investigate how the relative guarantee on the principal’s expected gains
from incentives depends on the distribution of innate costs. When the innate cost is
uniformly distributed, the guarantee is exactly the size of agent expected rents. In other
words, the principal is guaranteed at least half the efficiency gains from incentive con-
tracting. More generally, we provide sufficient conditions on the distribution of innate
costs for the guarantee to be greater than one half and conditions for the guarantee to
be less (i.e., for the principal to obtain less than half of the efficiency gains for some re-
alization of agent preferences). The focus on the possibility of a 50/50 split of surplus
is not only analytically convenient, but may be relevant for assessing “fairness” con-
siderations surrounding the introduction of incentives. For instance, as discussed by
Lopomo and Ok (2016, p. 263), a regularity in laboratory experiments where one party
holds a clear strategic advantage (such as ultimatum games) is surplus division around
the 50/50 split, presumably because subjects consider such a split as fair. A guarantee
that the principal will obtain at least half the surplus from the introduction of incentives
is in this sense a guarantee that the expected outcome of contracting will not be un-
fair on the principal (or in public procurement settings, on the general public on whose
behalf the principal might be presumed to act).
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Analytical approach
In terms of our analytical approach, the main novelty lies in the problem of mapping, as
a function of agent expected rents, the innate cost distribution to a tight or sharp lower
bound for the principal’s gains from incentives.2 This takes place in two main steps. The
first step involves determining a lower bound on the principal’s expected gains from
incentives for each level of agent expected rents. The second step involves showing that
the bound is tight.
First step. Following a characterization of mechanisms that solve the principal’s
problem (see Section 3), we determine an expression for the principal’s expected gains
from incentives that depends on the agent’s marginal disutility of effort at each value of
the innate cost. A key property of any optimal mechanism is that the agent’s marginal
disutility of effort is monotone decreasing in the innate cost. Since the agent’s expected
rents are also determined by the marginal disutility of effort, a lower bound for the prin-
cipal’s expected gains given agent rents is obtained by minimizing them over the agent’s
marginal disutility of effort subject to a constraint determined by the agent’s rents and
subject to the aforementioned monotonicity. While optimization subject to monotonic-
ity constraints has often presented analytical challenges in the literature (see Hellwig
(2008) for a discussion), it turns out to be tractably solved in our case by reference to a
“convexification argument” explained below. The solution to the minimization problem
provides a lower bound on the principal’s gains from incentives.
Second step. The remaining step establishes tightness. This involves exhibiting disu-
tility functions for which the principal’s expected gains are equal to, or at least arbitrarily
close to, the aforementioned bound. This is done by finding disutility functions such
that, for the solution to the principal’s mechanism design problem, the agent’s marginal
disutility of effort corresponds to the solution to the minimization problem in the previ-
ous step. In this sense, it justifies our focus on the agent’s marginal disutility of effort in
an optimal mechanism.
Relationship to empirical literature on procurement
Our results connecting the shape of the innate cost distribution to the relative welfare of
the players may be helpful for understanding existing empirical work on procurement.
For instance, we argue (in Section 5) that efficiency gains guaranteed for the principal
tend to be larger when the agent’s innate costs are more concentrated at lower values.
This seems to be the prevalent case in the empirical literature, where there is often a
long tail of firms with high costs.
The fact that the shape of the innate cost distribution plays a critical role in deter-
mining the possible welfare implications of incentive contracting is, in fact, anticipated
by empirical work. A case in point is Abito (2015), who uses a version of Laffont and
Tirole’s (1986) model in his study of electric utilities, and where each firm’s innate cost
efficiency is determined by its type. He explains that his counterfactual predictions turn
on the shape of the type distribution:
2The terms “tight” and “sharp” are applied variously to bounds that cannot be improved on.
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The shape of the type distribution is an important determinant in the design of the optimal
mechanism and the welfare gains it delivers. The gains from the optimal mechanism are
not simply about getting all firms to exert more effort, but rather more about effectively
mitigating the cost of the regulator’s informational disadvantage. The cost of the informa-
tional disadvantage is determined by the shape of the type distribution which therefore
importantly affects the measure of welfare gains. Thus, as in most studies on asymmetric
information, the key challenge is to estimate this distribution.
The results in the present paper could turn out to be useful in such empirical settings,
because they provide a way to make relevant predictions without data to inform agent
preferences for effort. The usual approach in empirical work using the Laffont and Tirole
framework (such as in Abito’s paper, but also in other important contributions such as
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002)) is to estimate disutility functions using data that go beyond
data on firms’ innate costs.3
Layout
The layout of the paper is as follows. The rest of this section discusses further related
literature. Section 2 then introduces the cost-based procurement model, and Section 3
provides an analysis of optimal contracting in this model. Section 4 derives our char-
acterization of expected welfare under optimal contracts. Section 5 shows how the set
of feasible expected payoffs depends on the distribution of innate costs. Section 6 con-
cludes. Formal proofs not included in the main text are provided in the Appendix.
Further related literature
At a conceptual level, the value in obtaining “robust predictions” on welfare in our en-
vironment is related to a broader interest in the theory literature for obtaining robust
predictions on economic variables. Notably, work such as Bergemann and Morris (2013,
2016) and Bergemann et al. (2015, 2017) explore the predictions that can be made by
an outside observer to an interaction, given information on certain fundamentals, but
lacking other pertinent details. The pertinent details in these papers relate to the infor-
mation structure, i.e., players’ information on the payoff-relevant state or payoff types,
and, where relevant, their higher-order beliefs.4 An important part of their motivation
is that in many settings, “the information structure will generally be very hard [for an
outsider] to observe, as it is in the agents’ minds and does not necessarily have an ob-
servable counterpart” (Bergemann and Morris (2013, p. 1252)). Our motivation is sim-
ilar, although the economic objects are different. Our interest is in contracting settings
where certain information—especially the distribution of innate costs—may be read-
ily observed (or at least inferred from data) and at the same time, other information—
especially regarding the agent’s preferences for effort—is not.
3For instance, Abito uses firm performance in between regulatory rate cases, when incentives for cost
reduction are strongest. Gagnepain and Ivaldi use the performance of those firms subject to high-powered
fixed-price contracts.
4Interest in making robust predictions is clearly more widespread in the theory literature. An example
is Segal and Whinston (2003), who determine predictions on outcomes that hold across a broad class of
contracting games with a single principal and many agents.
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Our work is also connected to the developing literature on robust incentive con-
tracts, in that our focus is on the lower bound of the principal’s performance across
possible realizations of ambiguous preferences. The robust contracting literature takes
a worst-case perspective to evaluating incentive contracts (in terms of levels or regret-
type criteria) and includes work such as Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), Chassang (2013),
Garrett (2014), Carroll (2015), and Dai and Toikka (2017). If we view “adversarial Nature”
as choosing the agent’s preferences or technology, then the main difference between
this literature and the present paper is the timing of Nature’s move. In this paper, Na-
ture moves before the principal determines an optimal contract, whereas in the robust
contracting literature, Nature’s move comes after. There is some similarity in proof ap-
proach to the paper by Garrett, who considers a similar procurement model, but for a
principal who is ignorant of the agent’s disutility function. The main similarity is the
need to construct adversarial disutility functions (i.e., disutility functions chosen so that
the principal obtains a low payoff).
Another connection to the robust contracting literature is the observation that high
payoffs for the agent can imply a good outcome for the principal. This idea is exploited
in the analysis of linear contracts by Chassang (2013) and Carroll (2015), where linear
contracts turn out to guarantee the principal a payoff that is proportional to the agent’s
rents. The present analysis also shows that a high value of expected agent rents can
imply a high guarantee on the principal’s expected gains from incentive contracting.
This guarantee is obtained under the hypothesis of optimal contracting by the principal,
rather than given an arbitrary linear incentive scheme.
A final strand of literature to be mentioned is econometric analyses of incentive de-
sign in regulation and procurement. For instance, Perrigne and Vuong (2011) show how
one can identify (in their case, nonparametrically) structural parameters of the Laffont
and Tirole (1986) model using data on observables such as realized demand, realized
cost, and payments to the agent. A connection to the present work is the objective of
drawing implications from a combination of weak assumptions on model primitives to-
gether with the hypothesis of optimal contracting.
2. The model
The procurement model
We introduce our ideas in a standard procurement framework that is a simplified version
of Laffont and Tirole ((1986, 1993); henceforth, LT). The model we consider is popular in
the literature; see, for instance, Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007).
The principal is responsible for procuring a fixed quantity of a good from an agent
who is the supplier. We normalize the quantity to a single unit. The principal aims to
procure this unit while minimizing total payments to the agent.
The agent is associated with an “innate cost” β (that we sometimes refer to as his
type), and a cost-reduction technology. The latter is characterized by a disutility func-
tion ψ : R → R+. If the agent exerts effort e to reduce costs, then he incurs a private
disutility ψ(e). This disutility could represent the inconvenience of putting measures
in place to lower costs or could represent physical costs incurred by the agent that are
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not direct costs accounted for in the contract. After effort e, the realized production
cost is C = β− e ∈ R. While the principal knows the function ψ and observes the real-
ized production cost C, both the innate cost β and the effort e are the agent’s private
information.
The environment permits transfers between the principal and agent. Following LT,
we adopt the accounting convention that the realized production cost C is paid by the
principal. In addition, the agent receives a transfer y. Payoffs are quasi-linear in money,
so that the agent’s Bernoulli utility (in case of effort e and transfer y) is y −ψ(e). In case
the agent refuses the contract, he does not produce and earns payoff zero. Procurement
of the unit is taken to be essential for the principal. Subject to the constraint of ensuring
the unit is supplied, the principal’s objective is then to minimize the expectation of total
expenditure y +C.
The disutility function ψ satisfies the following requirements. It is taken to be non-
decreasing and convex, with ψ strictly increasing on R+ and constant at zero on R−. We
takeψ to be Lipschitz continuous with the best Lipschitz constant strictly greater than 1.
We then let be the set of all disutility functions ψ that satisfy these conditions.
That the agent incurs positive disutility from positive effort ensures that the innate
cost β has the intended interpretation: the agent chooses zero effort when incentives
are absent. We assume the agent can costlessly inflate the production cost above the in-
nate cost by choosing negative effort, although this does not occur in equilibrium.5 The
possibility for the agent to inflate the production cost above his innate cost ensures that
every type can attain the production cost prescribed for every other type. This in turn
readily permits a characterization of incentive compatibility through application of a
certain envelope theorem (that of Carbajal and Ely (2013), as described below).6 Mono-
tonicity and convexity of ψ are standard shape restrictions. It is natural to expect that
higher effort is more costly (monotonicity) and oftentimes additionally that there are di-
minishing returns to cost reductions (convexity). Diminishing returns would also imply
the best Lipschitz constant being greater than 1. This is a kind of Inada condition that
guarantees efficient effort is bounded and that plays a role in the existence of optimal
mechanisms. Lipschitz continuity itself is a technical condition, which, given convexity
ofψ, is a restriction on this function only at large values of effort e that are not chosen in
equilibrium. It is again helpful for permitting application of the envelope theorem.
Note in addition that the agent’s preferences for effort are independent of the innate
cost (i.e., ψ does not depend on β). While this assumption is common in the procure-
ment literature, its applicability depends on the circumstances at hand. For instance,
independence describes well a scenario where the agent’s private information on β re-
lates to the cost of obtaining a fixed input to production, where the quantity of this input
does not depend on the amount of effort exerted.7
5In particular, conditional on the agent reporting truthfully, an optimal mechanism never asks the agent
to generate a production cost strictly above his innate cost.
6See Garrett and Pavan (2012), who also permit such cost inflation to facilitate application of an envelope
theorem in an LT-type model.
7Note that our analysis is still informative about the set of expected payoffs for broader classes of prefer-
ences, since the payoff set for these broader preferences must nest the set that we characterize below (for
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The agent’s innate cost β is drawn from a cumulative distribution function (cdf) F
that is twice continuously differentiable and has density f . We take F to have full sup-
port on a bounded interval [β, β̄], where it seems natural to require β > 0. Finally, we
assume throughout that F(β)/f (β) is strictly increasing (equivalently, F is strictly log
concave) and Lipschitz continuous, denoting its first derivative by h(β).
Since our view is that the analyst knows the distribution of innate costs F , the above
assumptions can at least be verified on a case-by-case basis. Log concavity of F is a
common restriction in the literature.
The timing of the game is then the same as in LT. First, the agent learns his private
typeβ, which is drawn from F . Then the principal offers a mechanism, which prescribes
payments to the agent as a function of any messages sent by the agent and the realized
cost, which is observable and contractible. Next, the agent determines whether to ac-
cept the mechanism. If he does not, the agent earns payoff zero. If he does accept, then
he sends a message to the principal and then makes his effort choice. The production
cost is realized and the principal makes a payment to the agent as prescribed by the
mechanism.
Without loss of generality, we can consider incentive-compatible and individually
rational direct mechanisms. The agent makes a report of his type β̂ to the mechanism.
The mechanism then prescribes a “production cost target” C(β̂). If the agent reports
his innate cost β truthfully, then meeting the cost target requires effort e(β) = β−C(β),
which can therefore be understood as the effort recommendation of the mechanism for
type β. If the agent achieves the target, i.e., C = C(β̂), then he is paid y(β̂). Otherwise,
if C = C(β̂), the payment to the agent is negative. Since the mechanism is individually
rational, a choice to report β̂ and select cost C = C(β̂) is never optimal for the agent.
This observation is enough to transform the principal’s problem from one of both moral
hazard and adverse selection into one of only adverse selection.
Objective of the analysis
The aim of our analysis is to understand the payoff implications of introducing incentive
contracts. As discussed in the Introduction, we consider an analyst who understands
that the cost-based procurement model above is the correct description of the environ-
ment and who has a reliable prior belief F regarding the innate cost β. However, she
does not know the agent’s preferences for effort, only that they are described by a func-
tion in. She does know that the principal, who eventually designs and implements an
incentive contract to minimize the expected total payment to the agent, has the same
distribution F in mind for the innate cost, knows the disutility function ψ precisely, and
chooses mechanisms optimally. We ask, what expected payoff implications does the
analyst consider possible?
instance, when the principal is guaranteed only a small fraction of the expected surplus under the imposed
restrictions on preferences, the guarantee can only be smaller for more admissive restrictions). For a more
precise characterization, one would need to adapt the steps in our analysis for the broader preferences
(which may be more or less tractable depending on the restrictions in question).
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3. Preliminaries
Analysis of the principal’s contracting problem
We begin by extending analysis familiar from LT to the present environment. The main
point of difference is that we are more permissive in the restrictions on ψ; for instance,
we do not require ψ to be differentiable. Fix the mechanism offered by the principal
(as described above). Note that if the agent makes a report β̂, then the mechanism pre-
scribes a production cost target C(β̂). By the observation regarding individual rational-
ity of the mechanism in the previous section, we may presume the agent meets the cost
target. Then the agent’s payoff, if his true innate cost is β, is
y(β̂) −ψ(β−C(β̂)).
Let ∂−ψ denote the left derivative of ψ. We argue (see Appendix A.1) that we can
consider mechanisms where the agent’s rents are given, as a function of his true innate







This follows from incentive compatibility of the mechanism, after applying the envelope
result of Carbajal and Ely (2013) for nondifferentiable objective functions, and from con-
sidering mechanisms that maximize the principal’s expected payoff for a given effort











The principal’s expected total payment in a mechanism that optimally implements an
effort policy e(·) is
E
[
β̃− VG(e(β̃), β̃)], (3)
where
VG(e, β) = e−ψ(e) − F(β)
f (β)
[∂−ψ](e) (4)
(we leave the dependence of VG on ψ and F implicit). Here, VG(e, β) is the virtual gain
from incentives that induce effort e for innate cost β, comprising efficiency gains e −
ψ(e) from effort less a term accounting for agent rents.
Considering minimization of (3) by choice of the effort policy, we have the following
result.
8Note that one might be tempted to believe that precisely the same analysis usually performed when
ψ is differentiable should carry through, given that a convex disutility function ψ is differentiable except at
countably many points. The difficulty, however, is that effort is endogenous, since it is chosen by the princi-
pal and, hence, may be chosen at kinks in the disutility with positive probability (in spite of the continuous
distribution of innate costs). As Carbajal and Ely point out, this necessitates alternative arguments.
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Proposition 3.1. Any effort policy e∗(·) for an optimal mechanism solves, for almost all
innate costs β,
W (β) = max
e
VG(e, β).
Optimal effort policies e∗(·) are essentially unique and nonincreasing. Also,
[∂−ψ](e∗(β))< 1 for almost all β.9
The result shows that there is an optimal effort policy that maximizes virtual gains
from incentives pointwise; also, the optimal policy is essentially unique (in what follows,
we restrict attention to versions of the optimal policy e∗(β) that maximize virtual gains
at all values ofβ, not merely almost all). In other words, the validity of the “first-order” or
“relaxed program” approach to solving the design problem is established. While such a
result is readily anticipated from earlier work (including LT), it is obtained under weaker
conditions than usually assumed. Because the first-order approach is valid, no addi-
tional restrictions on the shape of ψ are needed to justify restriction to deterministic
effort policies (see Strausz (2006) for this observation in a related model).
The properties obtained for optimal effort e∗(·) follow from examining the vir-
tual gains VG(e, β). Effort is weakly downward distorted (note that we may have
[∂−ψ](eFB ) < 1 at an efficient effort level eFB if there is a kink in ψ at eFB; hence, un-
like the case for differentiable disutility functions, an optimal mechanism may specify
efficient effort for a positive measure of innate costs). Downward distortions in effort are
due to the familiar reason that they reduce the rents the agent can expect in an incentive-
compatible and individually rational mechanism. Distortions are larger for higher val-
ues ofβ, which can be understood in part from examining the expression for agent rents
in (1): in particular, the agent’s rents for a given innate cost depends on the effort in-
duced from all higher innate costs. It is worth emphasizing here that monotonicity of
effort therefore comes from optimization of the virtual gains in (4) given log concavity
of F . The condition for an effort policy to be implementable in an incentive-compatible
mechanism is weaker, since all that is required is that C(β) = β− e(β) is nondecreasing
with β (see the discussion immediately preceding Lemma A.2 in the Appendix).
Quadratic disutility
To shed further light on the properties of an optimal mechanism, it is useful to consider
the case of quadratic disutility, which often receives attention in the literature. To be
precise, given the restrictions in the model setup, consider functions that satisfy ψ(e) =
ke2/2 on an interval [0, ē], with ē > 1/k and k > 0 (such functions can be chosen in 
for any k> 0). Optimal effort then satisfies, for all β,
e∗(β) = max{0, 1/k− F(β)/f (β)}.
It is then easy to see that the expected rents in (2) vary continuously with k. As k grows
large, optimal effort equals 0 with a probability approaching 1. Hence, expected rents
9Note that the analysis here assumes the agent resolves indifferences over reports by reporting truthfully.
This is the usual approach in the literature.
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shrink to 0 as k→ ∞. Conversely, as k is taken to 0, optimal effort is large and positive
uniformly across types β (since F/f is bounded), and the agent’s marginal disutility of





which by Proposition 3.1 is an upper bound on rents that holds across all disutility func-
tions in , given the distribution F . We can conclude that expected rents can take any
value in (0, R̄) for some value of k.
Defining the analyst’s problem
We now define the objects of interest for the analyst: the principal’s expected gains from
incentives and agent expected rents under an optimal mechanism. Given a cdf F for
innate costs, for any ψ ∈, the principal implements an optimal mechanism with es-
sentially unique effort e∗(·). Agent expected rents in the optimal mechanism are given
by (2), evaluated at the optimal effort policy. We denote these expected rents byR(ψ; F ).
Alternatively, the principal’s expected gains from incentives are
G(ψ; F ) = E[W (β̃)].
Our interest is in characterizing, for each F , the set
U ≡ {(R(ψ; F ),G(ψ; F )) ∈R2+ :ψ ∈}.
4. Analysis
Further preliminary observations on the analyst’s problem
Recalling Proposition 3.1 and the discussion in the previous section, the set of possible
agent rents is [0, R̄) with R̄ given by (5). To see this, recall that expected rents in (0, R̄)
are obtained by the quadratic disutility functions considered in the previous section.
Expected rents equal to R̄ cannot occur, due to the final claim in Proposition 3.1 and
the expression for expected rents in (2). Expected rents equal to 0 occur if and only if
optimal effort is constant (almost surely) at 0. The reason is that ∂−ψ is strictly positive
at positive effort values. Therefore, the case with zero rents occurs only when the right
derivative of ψ is above 1 at 0 (i.e., [∂+ψ](0) ≥ 1). In such cases, the principal’s expected
gains from incentives are 0.
Given these observations, our interest is to determine the expected gains from in-




G(ψ; F ) :ψ ∈, R(ψ; F ) =R}
on (0, R̄). This function determines the lower boundary of the set U . We show by Propo-
sitions 4.1 and 4.2 below that it is strictly increasing and weakly convex (properties that
were emphasized in the Introduction).
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Finally, note that while Ginf(R) defines the infimum of expected gains from incen-
tives for each level of agent expected rentsR ∈ (0, R̄), arbitrarily higher gains from incen-
tives can occur depending on the disutility function. We formalize this in Corollary 4.1
below. The argument is based on the following idea. For a disutility function ψ ∈ 
associated with a point close to the boundary of U , we can consider another disutility
function of the form
ψ̄(e; a, ε) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 if e≤ 0,
εe if e ∈ (0, a],
εa+ψ(e− a) if e > a
(6)
for ε, a > 0. These parameters can be chosen so that expected gains from incentives
under an optimal mechanism take values aboveG(ψ; F ), while expected rents are close
to R(ψ; F ).10 The idea behind considering disutility functions of this form is that the
agent is permitted to achieve cost reduction a almost for free when ε is small, implying
an increase in the surplus that can be generated from incentives. For such a disutility
function with small enough ε, optimal effort is at least a for all innate costs. Also, for an
innate cost β assigned effort e∗(β) > 0 in an optimal mechanism for ψ, optimal effort
can be set to e∗(β) + a in a mechanism that is optimal for ψ̄(·; a, ε). It follows that ex-
pected surplus increases by at least a(1 − ε) in a mechanism optimal for ψ̄(·; a, ε), while
any additional expected rents vanish as ε→ 0. Thus, once we have determined disutility
functions associated with points at or arbitrarily close to the boundary of U , it is possible
to modify these functions to attain points with higher expected gains from incentives.
Main arguments
A key step in determining Ginf(R) (given the innate cost distribution F) is to recognize
that the virtual gains from incentives can be represented by an envelope formula. Given
F and ψ, the virtual gains are W (β) = maxeVG(e, β) (where recall VG is defined in (4)).
Because ψ is Lipschitz, and because F/f is differentiable and Lipschitz, the conditions
for the envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002) are satisfied. We can conclude
that








where recall h(β) = ddβ [ F(β)f (β) ]. Note that W (β̄) is nonnegative and may be strictly
positive depending on the disutility function. Also, W (·) is nonincreasing. This
can be understood by observing that the term that accounts for rents in (4), i.e.,
−(F(β)/f (β))[∂−ψ](e), is nonincreasing in β for any effort e (as F/f is strictly increas-
ing). Put simply, the virtual gains are larger for lower innate costs because the expected
rent the principal must give to the agent as a result of raising the efforts for these innate
10For the disutility functions ψ that we show are close to the boundary of U , the modified disutility
ψ̄(·; a, ε) remains convex and, hence, in provided ε is small enough.
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costs is smaller (recall that, by (1), the rents earned for an agent with innate cost β are
determined by the effort asked for all higher innate costs).
We can now find a convenient expression for the expected gains from incentives for
the principal. We have










where the second equality follows from integration by parts. One way to think about the
second term in (7) is to note that a reduction in β increases the term in (4) that accounts
for agent rents (−(F(β)/f (β))[∂−ψ](e)). The marginal effect, given an optimal effort
policy, is h(β)[∂−ψ](e∗(β)). This effect can be viewed as cumulative; the marginal effect
accrues to all lower innate costs, which have probability F(β), and this is weighted in
the expectation by the density f (β) for type β.
The rest of our argument can be understood in relation to the two main steps out-
lined in the Introduction. Completing the first step involves determining a lower bound
on the principal’s gains from incentives given agent expected rents R. To do so, we set
the principal’s virtual gains from incentives for type β̄ (that is, W (β̄)) equal to its mini-
mum possible value, 0. We then consider minimizing the second term of (7) by choice
of the marginal disutility of effort function [∂−ψ](e∗(·)), subject to the agent’s expected
rents in (2) being equal toR. We know from Proposition 3.1 that the marginal disutility of
effort can be assumed to be non-increasing, so we impose this monotonicity constraint
in the optimization. The constrained minimization problem delivers a lower bound on
the principal’s expected gains G(ψ; F ) over disutility functions ψ ∈, given that agent
expected rents R(ψ; F ) must be equal to R. Our second step then involves showing the
bound is tight. This requires demonstrating the existence of a disutility function in 
such that the principal’s expected gains from incentives coincide with the bound or at
least can be taken arbitrarily close. This involves reverse engineering admissible disutil-
ities ψ such that the marginal disutility of effort function [∂−ψ](e∗(·)) is equal, or arbi-
trarily close to, the one determined in the minimization problem of the first step; that is,
it involves showing that the solution to the minimization problem or some nearby func-
tion is actually the marginal disutility of effort for the agent in the principal’s optimal
mechanism for some disutility function ψ.
We now state the minimization problem of the first step, where we determine our
lower bound L∗(R) as a function of agent rents R.
Problem I. Let  be the set of functions γ : [β, β̄] → [0, 1] such that γ is nonincreasing.






1294 Daniel F. Garrett Theoretical Economics 16 (2021)










For an interpretation of P , suppose there is a disutility function such that γ(β) is the
agent’s marginal disutility of effort for each type β in an optimal mechanism. Suppose
also that type β̄ generates zero virtual gains for the principal (i.e., that W (β̄) = 0). Then
the first component of P(γ) is the agent’s expected rent, while the second component
is the principal’s expected gains from optimal incentives. Then function L∗(·) can be
obtained from the lower boundary of the set{
P(γ) : γ ∈ }.
As a basis for functions in , we consider step functions
γx(β) =
{
1 if β ∈ [β, x),
0 if β ∈ [x, β̄],
where x ∈ [β, β̄]. We show (see Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 4.1 in the Appendix)
that {P(γ) : γ ∈ } is equal to the convex hull of {P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]}.11 Because {P(γx ) : x ∈
[β, β̄]} is a closed curve (see further explanation following Proposition 4.1), the convex
hull is also closed.
A pair (R, L∗(R)) forR ∈ (0, R̄) is a point on the lower boundary of this convex hull. It
is then immediate that L∗(·) is strictly increasing (since h is strictly positive) and weakly
convex. In addition (by an application of Carathéodory’s theorem), any point (R, L∗(R))
forR ∈ (0, R̄) is a convex combination of points P(γx ) for at most two values of x. Hence
(by linearity of P), there is a solution to Problem I that can be written as a convex com-
bination of step functions γx for two values of x. To summarize, we have the following
result.
Proposition 4.1. For any R ∈ (0, R̄), a solution γ∗ : [β, β̄] → [0, 1] to the minimization
in Problem I exists. The minimum functionL∗(·) is strictly increasing and weakly convex.
For any R ∈ (0, R̄), there is a solution described by two cutoffs βl and βu, with β ≤ βl ≤
βu ≤ β̄. In particular, γ∗(β) = 1 on [β, βl ), γ∗(β) is constant and strictly between 0 and 1
on [βl, βu ), and γ∗(β) = 0 on [βu, β̄].
To understand better Proposition 4.1, consider the curve {P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]}, which
is parametrically defined through the thresholds x of the step functions γx and defined
in the space of players’ welfare. To define this curve explicitly as a function of the agent’s
rents R, let x(R) be the threshold for the step function associated with rent R. This





11The convex hull of the set {P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]} is the smallest convex set that contains it.







P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]
} = {(R, p(R)) :R ∈ [0, R̄]}.
To give an interpretation to p(R), it is the expected gains for the principal when the
agent has expected rent R, when the agent’s marginal disutility of effort is given by a
step function and, hence, by γx(R), and when virtual gains for the highest type are equal
to zero (i.e.,W (β̄) = 0). Using the implicit function theorem, x′(R) = 1/F(x(R)) for allR.
Therefore, p′(R) = h(x(R)). Since x(·) is an increasing function, p(·) is convex when h
is increasing (i.e., when F/f is strictly convex) and concave when h is decreasing (i.e.,
when F/f is strictly concave).12
Now consider the value of the minimization problem. If h is increasing, then
L∗(R) = p(R) for all R ∈ (0, R̄), since the lower boundary of the aforementioned con-
vex hull is given by the curve p(·) itself. That is, the fact L∗(R) = p(R) follows because,
when F/f is convex, the solution to Problem I is a step function given by γx(R) for each
value of expected rents R. An example of this case is displayed on the left side of Fig-
ure 1. The thresholds in Proposition 4.1 are then βl = βu = x(R). If h is decreasing, then
points on the lower boundary of the convex hull are convex combinations of (0, 0) and
(R̄, p(R̄)). An example of this case is displayed on the right side of Figure 1. A solution
to Problem I is then γ∗ = (1 − R/R̄)γβ + (R/R̄)γβ̄, which is constant at R/R̄ on (0, R̄).
Note that L∗(R) = (R/R̄)p(R̄). The thresholds in the proposition are βl = β and βu = β̄.
Finally, note that cases where F/f is neither convex nor concave can also be handled by
considering points on the lower boundary of the convex hull of {P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]}, as
explained above.
We now show that the lower bound on gains from incentives given byL∗ is tight and,
hence, coincides with the functionGinf.
Proposition 4.2. Fix a distribution F and fix any R ∈ (0, R̄). For any ε > 0, there exists
ψ ∈ such that
R(ψ; F ) =R
and
G(ψ; F )<L∗(R) + ε.
Hence,Ginf(R) =L∗(R).





2f ′(β)2 − f ′′(β)f (β)),
while F/f is strictly concave when the reverse inequality holds. Mierendorff (2016) discusses the convex-
ity/concavity of (1 − F )/f and gives an analogous condition.
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Figure 1. Examples with F/f convex and concave. Left side: β distributed with density
f (β) = 5/2 − β on [1, 2] so that F/f is convex. Right side: β from a shifted and truncated stan-
dard normal distribution so that F/f is concave. Truncation is to [−3, −2] for the standard nor-
mal, and subsequent shifting yields a support [1, 2]. On each side, the black curve is p(·) and the
shaded area is its convex hull. The black circles lie on the lower boundary of the convex hulls
((R, p(R)) = (0.167, 0.224) = P(γ1.5 ) for the left side and (R, L∗(R)) = (0.044, 0.011) for the right
side, where note R= ∫ 1.51 F(s)ds).
The proof of Proposition 4.2 involves finding disutility functions ψ ∈ such that the
left derivative of disutility at optimal effort levels, i.e., [∂−ψ](e∗(·)), approaches a fixed
solution γ∗ to Problem I (as mentioned in the outline of our approach above). To illus-
trate the nature of the argument, we consider in the main text the apparently simplest
case where the thresholds in Proposition 4.1 satisfy β = βl < βu ≤ β̄, which occurs, for
instance, if F/f is concave (in this case, recall that βu = β̄). The corresponding solution
to Problem I, γ∗, is constant at R/
∫ βu
β F(s)ds ∈ (0, 1) on the interval [β, βu ).
We aim to find a disutility function ψ ∈  such that, at an optimal effort policy
e∗(·), (a) the left derivative of disutility of effort [∂−ψ](e∗(β)) is constant and equal to
R/
∫ βu
β F(s)ds for innate costs β below βu, and is zero (with zero effort exerted) for
higher innate costs, and (b) virtual gains from incentives VG(e∗(β), β) are equal to zero
for β= βu. For such a disutility function, the agent must obtain expected rents R, and
the principal’s expected gains from incentives must equal L∗(R).13
13Conditions (a) and (b) are not only sufficient for this to be true, but are also necessary provided that
the solution γ∗ to Problem I is essentially unique (e.g., if F/f is strictly concave). This can be seen from (7)
and (8) above.
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and k> 1, and put
ψ(e) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩








+ k(e− b) if e > b.
Then an optimal policy for the principal is to specify e∗(β) = b for β ∈ [β, βu] and
e∗(β) = 0 for β above βu, if any. This shows that the infimum of expected gains from
incentives (conditional on expected rents R) is attained.
The above derivation may be of interest because it allows us to understand the kind
of disutility function for which the lower bound is attained. For instance, when F/f is
strictly concave, the solution γ∗ to Problem I is essentially unique. Then points on the
lower boundary of the expected payoffs are obtained only by disutility functions of the
above form; specifically, with disutility of effort linear from zero up to some value b, as
determined above. The form of disutility functions that attain or approach the boundary
may be of interest if some functions are considered more plausible than others. In this
context, it is worth emphasizing that the bound obtained in Proposition 4.1 continues
to apply if we admit disutility functions only from some strict subset of  (naturally, in
this case, the bound may no longer be tight).
It may also be of interest to observe that the optimal mechanism corresponding to
the above disutility function is arguably rather simple. This mechanism has an indirect
implementation where the agent simply produces at cost C (without making any report
of type) and receives payment
y = max





in addition to reimbursement of the production cost C. This can be viewed as a menu
comprising a cost-reimbursement contract (i.e., y = 0 for all production costs) and a
“linear cost-sharing rule” where the agent gets R/
∫ βu
β F(s)ds per unit of cost savings.
See Chu and Sappington (2007) for an analysis of the performance of such menus more
generally. Because the agent’s marginal disutility of effort is R/
∫ βu
β F(s)ds up to effort
b, the agent is indifferent across efforts in [0, b] under the linear cost-sharing rule. The
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agent puts no effort and earns payoff zero under the cost-reimbursement contract. It
is then immediate that the agent prefers the linear cost-sharing rule if and only if β ≤
βu. Since in this case the agent is willing to choose effort equal to b, the effort policy
e∗(β) described above is optimal for the agent, and this mechanism is optimal for the
principal, assuming the agent chooses effort according to e∗(β).
Let us conclude this section by considering expected gains from incentives above the
lower boundary Ginf. The following corollary can be established using disutility func-
tions of the form introduced in (6).
Corollary 4.1. For any R ∈ (0, R̄), any G >Ginf(R), and any ε > 0, there exists ψ ∈
such that |G(ψ; F ) −G|< ε and |R(ψ; F ) −R|< ε.
As discussed above, the result is useful as it indicates that the characterization of
possible values of expected welfare reduces to a characterization of the lower bound
Ginf.
5. Properties of the payoff region
We now consider how the principal’s guaranteed gains from incentives depend on the
shape of the innate cost distribution. First note that when F is any uniform distribution,
h is constant and equal to 1 (since F(β)/f (β) = β − β), and so Ginf(R) = R for all R ∈
(0, R̄). In other words, when the expected surplus from incentive contracting is not too
large (precisely, when it is below 2R̄), the smallest share of this surplus that the principal
may earn is one half. This observation itself could be of interest for applications, as
several papers have drawn conclusions based on uniformly distributed innate costs (see,
for instance, Gasmi et al. (1997) and Rogerson (2003)). Building on the observation for
uniform distributions, we show the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Fix a distribution F . Then the following statements hold:14
(i) If F/f is concave and E[β̃] ≥ (β + β̄)/2, then Ginf(R) ≤ R for all R ∈ (0, R̄); the
inequality is strict if either concavity is strict or if E[β̃]> (β+ β̄)/2.
(ii) If F/f is convex and if E[β̃|β̃ ≤ β] ≤ (β+ β)/2 for all β ∈ (β, β̄], then Ginf(R) ≥ R
for allR ∈ (0, R̄); the inequality is strict if either convexity is strict or if E[β̃|β̃≤ β]<
(β+β)/2 for all β ∈ (β, β̄].
Consider first part (i). Provided F/f is concave, the mean of the innate costs being
above the midpoint (β + β̄)/2 is sufficient to conclude Ginf(R) ≤ R. The condition is
a sense in which the distribution is negatively skewed. The reason for the result is re-
lated to the observation that when innate costs are concentrated at higher values, the
principal’s optimal policy, for a fixed disutility function, calls for relatively small distor-
tions for high innate costs. In particular, the principal’s policy calls for positive effort,
14Note that both cases can occur. Case (i) applies to the distribution considered for the right side of
Figure 1, while case (ii) applies to the distribution considered for the left side of Figure 1.
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even when the surplus generated from this effort is relatively small. In turn, this permits
the agent to earn high expected rents even for disutility functions that permit only rel-
atively small increases in surplus through cost-reducing effort. That the agent obtains
high rents when the principal specifies positive effort at high innate costs follows from
considering the expression for rents in (1).
Intuition for part (ii) is then the reverse. When innate costs are more concentrated at
lower values, the optimal effort policy tends to be much more distorted at higher values
of the innate cost. Examining the equation for agent rents in (1), close to efficient effort
can be asked of types close to β, inducing marginal disutility of effort close to 1, without
granting too large rents to the agent (even for the lowest type β). When innate costs are
concentrated at lower values, even if the agent chooses close to efficient effort with high
probability, it can be guaranteed that the agent’s expected rents are not too large.
Another question related to the above discussion is whether any predictions on the
magnitude of the bound Ginf(R) can be made without any restrictions on the cost dis-
tributions F . The answer is negative as the following example attests.
Example 1. Consider innate cost distributions with cdf F(β) = (k(β − β))1/k/(k(β̄ −
β))1/k for k > 0. The distribution F satisfies all our conditions and F(β)/f (β) = k(β−
β), so that h(β) = k. Therefore, Ginf(R) = kR for R ∈ (0, R̄); this can be taken arbitrarily
large or small with k.
The intuition for Example 1 is much the same as the one provided above in relation
to Corollary 5.1. When k is small, the cdf F is convex and the distribution is concentrated
on high values of the innate cost. The principal’s optimal policy then asks high effort
for high values of the innate cost, even if the surplus generated through effort is small.
Conversely, when k is large, the cdf F is concave and the distribution is concentrated
on low values of the innate cost, so the reverse is true: the principal is unwilling to ask
high effort for high values of the innate cost unless the surplus generated through effort
is large.
As mentioned in the Introduction, empirical work on procurement often finds a
skewed distribution for firm costs, with many firms having similar cost performance
but with a long right tail of less efficient firms. Such an observation was made by Wolak
(1994) and Brocas et al. (2006) for regulated water utilities, and in the context of Laf-
font and Tirole’s model by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) for urban transport and by Abito
(2015) for electric utilities. Figure 2 presents a graphical analysis for a distribution esti-
mated in the study of Gagnepain and Ivaldi. Specifically, they estimate the log of innate
cost to be distributed (up to scaling) according to a Beta distribution, with parameters
0.59 and 2.15 (see their Table 3).15 The density, plotted on the left side of Figure 2, is
sharply downward sloping, capturing the concentration of firms at a baseline level of
the innate cost. The ratio of worst-case gains to rents Ginf(R)/R is plotted on the right
side of the figure. This is a setting where the principal, under an optimal contract, can
15It should be kept in mind that these parameter estimates are for a somewhat different underlying
model than the one we treat here, in particular because Gagnepain and Ivaldi’s model incorporates elastic
quantity choices by the firm.
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Figure 2. Example based on Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002, Table 3). Left side: Density of the
variable whose natural logarithm is distributed according to a Beta distribution with parameters
0.59 and 2.15. Right side: Corresponding ratio of infimum expected gains to expected agent rents
(values of rent R shown below 0.8).
be sure to extract a large fraction of the surplus generated through incentives. The ratio
Ginf(R)/R is below 2 for small values of agent rents R, but grows with the value of R.
6. Conclusions
This paper considered the problem of an analyst tasked with predicting equilibrium out-
comes of a principal–agent relationship, while possessing limited information about the
environment. In particular, we assumed that while the analyst has good grounds for de-
termining the distribution of (cost) performance absent incentives, she is ignorant of the
feasible agent technologies or preferences for responding to incentives. Given this lack
of information, we made only weak assumptions on agent preferences: monotonicity
and convexity of the disutility of effort as well as separability from the innate cost. We
then showed how to obtain sharp predictions on the set of expected payoffs that can
arise in equilibrium.
The analysis is informative regarding the relationship between agent and principal
rents in well designed incentive contracts under restrictions on the environment that
can be guided by theory (rather than resulting from, say, ad hoc functional form assump-
tions on the technology or agent preferences). The findings could perhaps be helpful in
further clarifying and refining a message on which economists seem to agree: in many
agency relationships, the presence of asymmetric information implies agent rents are in
expectation strictly positive, and sometimes sizable, even if incentive contracts are well
designed. Large agent rents need not be indicative of incentive contracts performing
poorly: we uncovered a tight positive relationship between the expected payoff of the
agent and the expected gains to the principal in optimal incentive contracts.
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In addition, this paper has developed a novel approach to determining the relation-
ship between principal and agent rents, which seems likely to be useful in other settings.
Most immediately, the Laffont–Tirole model has been applied in settings of executive
compensation in Edmans and Gabaix (2011), Edmans et al. (2012), Garrett and Pavan
(2012, 2015), and Carroll and Meng (2016). Given the proximity of these models to the
procurement model that we studied here, our results can be mapped almost directly.
The approach in this paper can, therefore, provide informative predictions on welfare,
say in a setting where managerial incentives are to be newly introduced (for instance, in
the context of a state-owned enterprise which had previously been run by bureaucrats
in the absence of direct financial incentives). Other settings where the results above
might perhaps be readily adapted include auctions for incentive contracts (as in Laffont
and Tirole (1987)) and dynamic incentive contracts with stochastically evolving types
(as in Garrett and Pavan mentioned above). More speculatively, there may exist ways to
adapt the ideas of the paper to other settings with adverse selection generally, such as
second-degree price discrimination models in the style of Mussa and Rosen (1978). For
instance, consider a firm that has practiced linear pricing of quantity with a fixed price
per unit, generating historical quantity data. What predictions can be made regarding
welfare if the firm, while still facing one-dimensional asymmetric information, departs
from linear pricing to choose an optimal nonlinear schedule? Note that a reasonably
successful application of our ideas might involve only finding bounds that are not tight
(or cannot be shown to be tight). In other words, it could be that only the first step in
our methodology can be mimicked or repurposed in some contexts.
Appendix: Proofs of all results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We begin by finding a lower bound on the principal’s expected payoff in a mechanism
with the production cost target given by C(·).
Lemma A.1. Fix an integrable function C : [β, β̄] → R that prescribes production costs
to each innate cost β. A lower bound on the principal’s expected total payment in an
incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism is given by
E
[
C(β̃) + y(β̃)] = E[β̃− VG(e(β̃), β̃)],
where e(β) = β−C(β) for all β and where VG is given by (4).
Proof. Let the agent of type β have payoff, when producing at realized cost C, equal to
v(C, β) = −ψ(β−C ) plus the transfer received from the principal. Here we can view the
cost target C as drawn from a set C = R (the “allocation set” in the language of Carbajal
and Ely (2013)). We seek to apply Theorem 1 of Carbajal and Ely to this setting.
Note that because ψ is assumed Lipschitz continuous, ψ(β − C ) is equi-Lipschitz
continuous inβ acrossC ∈ C, with the Lipschitz constant the same as forψ. This ensures
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the satisfaction of Assumption A3 of Carbajal and Ely. Note that satisfaction of their
Conditions A1 and A2 is immediate.16
Define, for each β ∈ [β, β̄] and each C ∈ C,
d̄v(C, β) ≡ lim inf
r↘0









dv(C, β) ≡ lim sup
r↗0









where the equalities follow from convexity of ψ. Hence, given −ψ is concave, functions
d̄v(C, β) and dv(C, β) are superderivatives of −ψ(·), evaluated at β−C. As a result, the
correspondence S : [β, β̄] ⇒R given by
S(β) ≡ {r ∈ R : d̄v(C(β), β) ≤ r ≤ dv(C(β), β)}
is nonempty. The correspondence S(β) is single-valued in case the above limits are
equal at (C(β), β) and is a closed interval of positive length otherwise. By convexity
of ψ, d̄v(−C, β) and dv(−C, β) are nonincreasing in (C, β); hence, d̄v and dv are mea-
surable functions, while C(·) is assumed measurable. Hence, d̄v(C(·), ·) and dv(C(·), ·)
are measurable, verifying Ely and Carbajal’s Assumption M. Note also that by the above
definitions, d̄v(C(β), β) and dv(C(β), β) depend only on e(β) = β − C(β) (and not β
and C(β) individually).
Now recall that the payment rule can be chosen to ensure the agent always finds it
optimal to set effort equal to β − C(β̂) for any report β̂. If the direct mechanism im-
plementing production cost rule C(·) is incentive compatible, the agent’s payoff can be
denoted V (β) = y(β) − ψ(β − C(β)) = maxβ̂∈[β,β̄]{y(β̂) − ψ(β − C(β̂))}. Since A1–A3
and M of Carbajal and Ely are satisfied, Theorem 1 of their paper applies. Hence, for any
β ∈ [β, β̄],




for some measurable selection s of S.
A lower bound on agent rents in an incentive-compatible and individually rational
mechanism is provided by taking s(β) = −[∂−ψ](e(β)) for all β (i.e., equal to the upper
bound for S), and by setting V (β̄) = 0 (since individual rationality requires V (β̄) ≥ 0).
16For Condition A1, we can pair C with the Borel sigma algebra on R, since feasible production cost
assignments are then measurable functions C : [β, β̄] →R.
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For an agent of type β to earn rents
∫ β̄
β [∂−ψ](e(x))dx when truth-telling in the direct











We now characterize effort policies that minimize the lower bound. Such policies
maximize pointwise the virtual gains VG(e, β) by choice of e ∈ R for almost every β; in
what follows, we omit the qualification that statements hold only for sets of innate costs
β that have probability 1, simply considering effort policies that maximize VG(e, β) for
every value of β.
Because the best Lipschitz constant for ψ is greater than 1, for each β ∈ [β, β̄],
there exists u > 0 such that VG(e, β) < 0 for all e < 0 and all e > u. Note that because
ψ is convex, the left derivative of ψ, i.e., ∂−ψ, is left continuous and nondecreasing.
Hence, VG(·, β) is upper semicontinuous for all β. This means that the maximizers
E∗(β) ≡ arg max[VG(e, β)] are nonempty and closed for each β. Since F(β)/f (β) is in-
creasing, standard monotone comparative statics arguments (see Topkis (1978)) imply
that E∗(β) is nonincreasing in the strong set order. We can then consider monotone
(nonincreasing) selections, denoted e∗(β), of the correspondence E∗ (for instance, one
can take maxE∗(β) or minE∗(β)).
We now show that effort policies that are monotone selections from E∗ can be im-
plemented as part of an incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism,
with the principal’s expected payment equal to the lower bound in Lemma A.1. For
a monotone selection e∗(·), the cost target is given by C∗(β) = β − e∗(β) for each β
(hence, C∗(·) is nondecreasing). Let then the payments to the agent when the cost tar-
get is met (in addition to the reimbursement of production costs) be given by y∗(β) =
ψ(e∗(β)) + ∫ β̄β [∂−ψ](e∗(x))dx. Take payments when the agent fails to meet the cost tar-
get to be small enough that this is never optimal for the agent.
Now let U(β, β̂) be the payoff obtained by type β when reporting β̂ and choosing
effort to meet the cost target. We have

















The third equality follows using the concept that a convex function is differentiable ex-
cept for at most countably many points (i.e., ∂−ψ= ψ′, except at these points). The in-
equality follows because C and ∂−ψ are nondecreasing functions. Given that the agent
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finds it optimal to meet the cost target C(β̂) for any report β̂, the inequality implies
incentive compatibility, as desired. Hence, the effort policy e∗ is implementable in an
incentive-compatible mechanism where the principal’s expected payment is given in
Lemma A.1, as we wanted to show.
We now prove a result that establishes the final claim in the proposition.
Lemma A.2. Let e∗(·) be any measurable selection from E∗. For all β> β, the left deriva-
tive of disutility at equilibrium effort, [∂−ψ](e∗(β)), must be strictly less than 1.
Proof. Let emin(β) be the minimal element of E∗(β). Note that [∂−ψ](emin(β)) ≤ 1; if
[∂−ψ](emin(β))> 1, effort can be reduced from emin(β) while increasing surplus, contra-
dicting the definition of emin(β). In addition, [∂−ψ](e)< 1 for all e < emin(β). Given the
first claim and convexity of ψ, the only way this can fail to be true is if [∂−ψ](emin(β)) =
[∂−ψ](e) = 1 for some e < emin(β). However, in this case, ψ is linear on [e, emin(β)] with
gradient equal to 1, contradicting that emin(β) is the minimum of the efficient effort
choices.
Now fixing β > β, we want to show that [∂−ψ](e∗(β)) < 1. Because F/f is assumed
strictly increasing, [∂−ψ](e∗(β)) ≤ [∂−ψ](emin(β)) follows from optimality of emin(β) for
type β and of e∗(β) for type β. Hence, the only case we need to consider is where
[∂−ψ](emin(β)) = 1. For this case, consider the effect on the virtual gain from incen-
tives VG(e, β) when reducing effort to e= emin(β) − ε for ε > 0 from the efficient effort
emin(β). The change is



































The equality follows because ψ is convex and, hence, differentiable except at countably
many points. The inequality follows because ∂−ψ is nondecreasing. The right-hand side
of the inequality is strictly positive for ε sufficiently small, since F(β)f (β) is strictly positive.
This shows that, indeed, e∗(β)< emin(β) and, hence, [∂−ψ](e∗(β))< 1.
We next determine further properties of optimal effort policies.
Lemma A.3. Optimal effort e∗(·) is essentially unique and essentially nonincreasing.
Proof. First, consider why any selection from optimal effort policiesE∗ must be nonin-
creasing (the argument is closely related to the one in Topkis (1978, Theorem 6.3)). Con-
sider, for a contradiction, an effort policy e∗ that maximizes virtual gains, but for which
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there are β′, β′′ ∈ [β, β̄] with β′ < β′′ and e∗(β′ ) < e∗(β′′ ). From the previous lemma,
[∂−ψ](e∗(β′′ ))< 1 and, hence, since ψ is convex, we conclude that e∗(β′′ ) −ψ(e∗(β′′ ))>
e∗(β′ ) − ψ(e∗(β′ )). Hence, if [∂−ψ](e∗(β′′ )) = [∂−ψ](e∗(β′ )), e∗(β′ ) does not maximize















because e∗(β′ ) maximizes virtual gains VG(e, β′ ). Since F(β
′′ )
f (β′′ ) >
F(β′ )

















which contradicts e∗(β′′ ) maximizing the virtual gains VG(e, β′′ ). We conclude that
e∗(β′′ ) ≤ e∗(β′ ).
We thus showed, in the language of Topkis (1978), that the set of maximizers
E∗(β) is strongly descending (β′′ > β′ implies e∗(β′′ ) ≤ e∗(β′ )). Every E∗(β) that is
not a singleton corresponds to an open interval, say (e′(β), e′′(β)) for e′(β), e′′(β) ∈
E∗(β). That E∗(β) is strongly descending implies that the collection of such intervals,
{(e′(β), e′′(β)) : β ∈ [β, β̄]}, is disjoint. Hence, essential uniqueness of optimal effort
follows because there can be at most countably many disjoint open intervals in R.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1.
A.2 Proof of results in Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1: {P(γ) : γ ∈ } = co{P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]}. We first show that {P(γ) : γ ∈ } is
equal to the convex hull of {P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]}, as claimed in the main text. Note that, by
Carathéodory’s theorem, any point in the convex hull of {P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]} (a set in R2)
can be written as the convex combination of points P(γx ) for at most three values of x.
By linearity of P and because any convex combination of step functions γx is in , this
point must reside in {P(γ) : γ ∈ }; i.e.,
co
{
P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]
} ⊆ {P(γ) : γ ∈ }.
Conversely, any point P(γ), γ ∈ , can be approximated arbitrarily closely by points
P(γk ), with γk being right-continuous step functions and, hence, convex combina-
tions of the step functions γx. In particular, there exists a sequence (γk )∞k=1 of such
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step functions such that P(γk ) ∈ co{P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]} for all k and with P(γk ) → P(γ)
as k → ∞. Since the convex hull of a compact set in R2 is itself compact, the con-
vex hull of {P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]} is compact. It therefore contains P(γ). This establishes
{P(γ) : γ ∈ } ⊆ co{P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]}, which implies the result.
Step 2: L∗ strictly increasing and convex. That L∗ is strictly increasing and convex
follows immediately from observing that (R, L∗(R)) forR ∈ (0, R̄) is a point on the lower
boundary of the convex hull co{P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]}.
Step 3: Form of a solution. The fact that there is a solution γ∗ described by the cut-
offs βl and βu follows because points on the lower boundary of co{P(γx ) : x ∈ [β, β̄]} can
be written as convex combinations of P(γx ) for at most two values of x. This follows
again by Carathéodory’s theorem. Consider the tangent line to the convex hull pass-
ing through the point (R, L∗(R)). This point belongs to the intersection of co{P(γx ) :
x ∈ [β, β̄]} and the aforementioned tangent line; a set with dimension 1. Hence, by
Carathéodory’s theorem, it can be written as the convex combination of at most two
points in the set. The claim in the proposition then follows, since there is then a solu-
tion to Problem I that can be written as a convex combination of the step functions γx
for two values of x.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Recall that in case W (β̄) = 0, the expected gains from
incentives is equal to
∫ β̄
β F(s)h(s)[∂−ψ](e∗(s))ds, where e∗ is an optimal effort policy.
Given F , consider a solution to Problem I, γ∗, that can be described by cutoffs βl and βu
as introduced in Proposition 4.1. We aim to select a sequence of disutility functions in
 such that the left derivative of the agent’s marginal disutility of effort in equilibrium,
[∂−ψ](e∗(·)), approaches γ∗(·), and whereW (β̄) is equal to 0.
While the case where β = βl < βu is considered in the main text, there are two re-
maining cases.
First case: β < βl = βu ≡ β∗. Suppose there is a solution to Problem I with β <
βl = βu ≡ β∗. We consider a sequence of disutility functions (ψn )∞n=1. Under an opti-
mal mechanism for the nth disutility function of the sequence, the agent exerts positive
effort for any innate cost below some threshold βn, but zero effort for any higher innate
cost. When positive effort is chosen, the left derivative of disutility is close to 1; precisely,
we ensure it is equal to 1 − ηn for a small but positive value η. So that, for every n, the








Taking η small enough, this equation determines a decreasing sequence (βn )∞n=1 in
(β∗, β̄), convergent to β∗, as well as a strictly positive sequence (bn )∞n=1 with
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The latter is used to define disutility functions
ψn(e) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩








bn + 2(e− bn ) if e > bn
for each positive integer n. For each n, ψn belongs to , and an optimal mechanism
features effort bn for innate costs below the threshold βn; effort for innate costs above
βn is 0. We thus obtain R(ψn; F ) =R for each n and can verify that





Second case: β<βl < βu. Suppose there is a solution to Problem I with β<βl < βu.
Hence, there is an interval on which γ∗(β) = 1, an interval on which γ∗(β) = γmid for
γmid ∈ (0, 1), and possibly an interval on which γ∗(β) = 0.
Let a = F(βu )f (βu )
γmid
1−γmid . Let η > 0 and let it be small enough that an innate cost βn is
defined implicitly by
(


















1 − γmid) − 1).
We can consider η to be small enough that (bn )∞n=1 takes values strictly greater than a for
every n.






0 if e≤ 0,












(bn − a) + 2(e− bn ) if e ∈ (bn, ∞).
Consider now effort levels that maximize the virtual gains VGn(e, β) ≡ e − ψn(e) −
F(β)
f (β) [∂−ψn](e). For each n, these satisfy e
∗
n(β) ∈ {0, a, bn}. The virtual gains for these
1308 Daniel F. Garrett Theoretical Economics 16 (2021)
















We have that both e∗n(β) = 0 and e∗n(β) = a are optimal in case β= βu, and both e∗n(β) =
a and e∗n(β) = bn are optimal in case β = βn (these observations follow by choice of a
and bn). Thus, given disutility ψn, the principal chooses effort e∗n(β) = 0 in case β> βu,
effort e∗n(β) = a in case β ∈ (βn, βu ), and effort e∗n(β) = bn in case β<βn. Note then that







































The third equality holds by choice of βn, while the final equality holds as a property of








which approaches L∗(R) = ∫ β̄β F(s)h(s)γ∗(s)ds as n→ +∞. This convergence follows
using that F(β)h(β) remains bounded on all of [β, β̄].
Proof of Corollary 4.1. The result is a consequence of the following observation.
Consider any disutility function ψ ∈ , with the right derivative at zero strictly posi-
tive (recall that the proof of Proposition 4.2 considered only such functions, so as to
approach the boundary of U ). Let a, ε > 0, with ε less than the aforementioned right
derivative. Then consider the disutility function ψ̄(e; a, ε) as defined in (6). Given this
disutility function, the principal’s virtual gains for innate cost β are zero for effort zero,
a(1 − ε) − F(β)
f (β)
ε
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for effort a, and
e− εa−ψ(e− a) − F(β)
f (β)
[∂−ψ](e− a)
for effort e > a. Note that the latter can be written as






for e′ = e − a > 0. Holding a fixed, provided ε is small enough, optimal effort for the
disutility ψ̄(e; a, ε) is at least a for all β. Also, if the agent with innate cost β takes effort
ě > 0 in the optimal policy for disutility function ψ, he takes effort ě+ a in the optimal
policy for ψ̄(·; a, ε) and, hence, the (left) marginal disutility of effort is unchanged (i.e.,
[∂−ψ](ě) = [∂−ψ̄(·; a, ε)](ě+a)). The (left) marginal disutility of effort for disutility func-
tion ψ̄(e; a, ε) is ε whenever the agent takes effort a. Also, the measure of β for which
the agent takes effort greater than a for ψ̄(·; a, ε) but zero under ψ(·) vanishes as ε→ 0.
Therefore, the expected gains from incentives under ψ̄(·; a, ε) are larger by an amount
that approaches a from below as ε is taken to zero. The agent’s expected rents are either
the same as under ψ (for instance, if the agent takes positive effort with probability 1
under ψ) or approach the value under ψ from above as ε→ 0.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 5.1
To prove Corollary 5.1, first consider part (i). Hence, suppose F(β)f (β) is concave and E[β̃] ≥
β+β̄











and if we can show the inequality is strict when F(β)f (β) is strictly concave or if E[β̃]>
β+β̄
2 .



































f (β̄)(β̄−β)f (β)dβ ≥ 12f (β̄) , because E[β̃] ≥
β+β̄
2 , and the inequality is






f (β̄)(β̄−β) are functions that take the same value at




f (β̄)(β̄−β) on (β, β̄) and the inequality is
strict in case F(β)f (β) is strictly concave. Part (i) of the corollary therefore follows.
Now consider part (ii). Hence, suppose F(β)f (β) is convex and E[β̃|β̃ ≤ β] ≤
β+β
2 for all
β ∈ (β, β̄]. For a given value R ∈ (0, R̄), there is a solution γ∗ to Problem I such that
γ∗(β) = 1 for β < β∗ and γ∗(β) = 0 for β > β∗. Then note that the conditional distribu-
tion defined on [0, β∗] by F̄(β) ≡ F(β)/F(β∗ ) with density f̄ satisfies F̄(β)
f̄ (β)
= F(β)f (β) , which
is convex. In addition, EF̄ [β̃] ≤
β+β∗
2 . Hence, considering the expression in (9) evaluated






with strict inequality when either F(β)f (β) is strictly convex or EF̄ [β̃] <
β+β∗
2 . This estab-
lishes the result.
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